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The Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence began with a focus on
clear statement rules, but then turned to prohibitory limits on the scope of
federal power. This Article specifies the differences between clear
statement rules and prohibitory limitations, and outlines some of the
factors courts should consider in determining which strategy to pursue in
any given context. The Article argues that the scope of the Commerce
Clause is an issue that should be resolved using clear statement rules.
The Court's decision in United States v. Lopez to follow a prohibitory
approach was both strategically mistaken and poorly executed. Although
the principles the Court established in Lopez have been largely
eviscerated by Gonzales v. Raich, the Court now has the opportunity to
consider whether to turn to a strategy of clear statement rules. Such an
approach would put Commerce Clause jurisprudence on a sounder
footing, and could be achieved without upsetting the results in any of the
major decisions in the post-Lopez era.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The basic dilemma of constitutionalism, at least as applied to questions of
federal-state relations, is how to strike the right balance between stability and
change. On the one hand, we do not want the assignment of responsibilities
among the different levels of government to shift around in an unpredictable
fashion. Governing requires long-term investments in laws, institutions, and
human capital. It is important that governments-and the people they govern-
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know where these investments are to be made. On the other hand, it is
inevitable that the assignment of responsibilities will change over time. New
technologies, changes in the scope of markets and the scale of enterprises, and
the emergence of new issues like environmental protection and international
terrorism require adjustments in the respective functions of the central and
regional governments. Within a framework of stability in the assignment of
functions, there must be some mechanism for change.I
Probably the best approach to reconciling stability and change in the
context of a federal system is to precisely set forth the functions of the central
government in the basic law or constitution and to allow additions and
subtractions through amendments. This is the way the problem is handled in
other constitutional federations, such as Germany and Switzerland.2 The
American Constitution adopts half of this strategy. It sets forth a fairly precise
list of the powers that, in 1787, seemed most appropriate for the federal
government to discharge, leaving all residual governmental powers with the
States. Unfortunately, it coupled this precise list of federal powers with an
amendment process that makes it extremely difficult to add to or subtract from
the list of powers given to the federal government. Thus, the American
Constitution, in what is arguably its most significant flaw, contains no adequate
mechanism for making needed changes in the assignment of powers between
the levels of government.
In default of a satisfactory formal mechanism for change, the solution to
adjusting the respective roles of the federal government and the States has been
judicial amendments of the Constitution-reinterpretations by the Supreme
Court of specific grants of power to the federal government. The net effect of
these judicial amendments has been to sanction the transfer of many functions
of government from the States to the federal government. The high water mark
in this process of judicial sanctioning of federal expansion was reached in
1985, when the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
3
seemed to say that questions about the proper allocation of powers should be
determined unilaterally by Congress, without any judicial input at all.
One year after the Garcia decision, in 1986, William Hubbs Rehnquist
became Chief Justice. Rehnquist dissented in Garcia, which overruled one of
his most important opinions written as an Associate Justice, National League of
Cities v. Usery.4 Rehnquist predicted that Garcia itself would some day be
overruled, and National League of Cities restored.5 This did not happen. But
the Rehnquist Court can be seen as a nineteen-year campaign by the late Chief
Justice and his allies to repudiate the underlying thesis of Garcia-that the
respective spheres of authority between the federal government and the states
1 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez,
1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 137-44.
2 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE (1964).
3 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
4 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
5 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
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should be determined solely by the political process. 6 A central theme of the
Rehnquist Court-perhaps the central theme-was that the federal courts do
have a vital role to play in determining the allocation of powers in the federal
system.
Constitutional commentators, overwhelmingly focused on questions of
individual rights, tend to be puzzled by the Rehnquist's Court absorption with
federalism. They often assume, cynically, that the Court's motivation for
enlarging the role of courts in federalism controversies was to mount a flank
attack on the individual rights decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts.7 But
a more charitable explanation is that the late Chief Justice and his allies
regarded Garcia and all it stands for as putting too much emphasis on the need
to accommodate change in the assignment of governmental roles and not
enough on the importance of stability. The central effort of the Rehnquist
Court, from this perspective, was to re-strike the balance between change and
stability in federalism in a way that more fully acknowledges the importance of
both values.
Looking back, we can see that the Rehnquist Court's campaign to define a
new role for courts in federalism controversies falls into roughly two periods.
The first period, which predated the beginning of the Rehnquist Court by a few
years and ran into the mid-1990's, was characterized by an effort to prescribe
clear statement rules in federalism controversies. Thus, in cases involving the
States' immunity from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment, the Court held
that such suits were permitted only if authorized by Congress in "clear and
unmistakable" language in the statute.8 The Court similarly held that conditions
attached to grants of federal monies could be enforced against the States only if
set forth "unambiguously" in the grant.9 And in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 10 the
Court said it would interpret a federal regulatory statute to apply to traditional
state functions, such as the appointment of state judges, only if there was a
''plain statement" from Congress requiring this result.
The second period, which ran from the mid-1990s to the waning days of
the Rehnquist Court, saw a shift from the articulation of clear statement rules to
the imposition of prohibitory limitations on the powers of Congress. The most
6 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549-555.
7 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 636-40 (1992)
(worrying that the Court's new clear statement rules might be a form of "backdoor" judicial
activism).
8 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 101 (1989);
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989). This particular clear statement rule originated
in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), decided the year before
Rehnquist became Chief Justice.
9 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
10 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).
11 Preemption is another very important category of cases where the Court has
occasionally asserted clear statement rules. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504 (1992). But the Court's inconsistency in following such rules leads me to omit
preemption as an unequivocal example of such a strategy.
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decisive shift came in the Eleventh Amendment context, where the Court
announced in Seminole Tribe v. Florida12 that Congress has no power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause-a result in
some tension with its decisions in the immediately preceding years requiring a
clear statement to abrogate. But the Court also announced new prohibitory
limitations under the Commerce Clause' 3 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 14 and a new prohibition against federal laws commandeering state
governmental officers.1
5
Whatever the Court's motives for moving from clear statement rules to
prohibitory limitations, the shift was ill-advised. The decision that reveals the
mistake most clearly is Gonzales v. Raich.16 Under the prohibitory approach to
the scope of the Commerce Clause inaugurated in United States v. Lopez,'
7
Congress can regulate intrastate activity that has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce only if that activity is "economic" in nature. It is difficult
to see how growing and consuming marijuana at home for medicinal purposes
is "economic" activity. The activity singled out in Raich was therefore
presumptively beyond the power of Congress to regulate under Lopez. But a
majority of the Court was unwilling to invalidate the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA), as applied to homegrown medical marijuana. To reach this result,
Lopez's prohibitory rule was watered down to the point where it may have little
continuing significance.
In order to rescue federalism after Raich, the Court should return to the
clear statement strategy for determining the sco e of congressional power it
began to articulate in the 1980s and early 1990s. The clear statement strategy
prescribes a much more constructive and workable role for the courts in
determining the balance between stability and change in the assignment of
powers between the federal government and the States. Moreover, under a clear
statement approach, Raich would have been an easy case for upholding federal
power. Congress, in the Controlled Substances Act, made explicit findings in
12 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
13 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
14 City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
15 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992).
16 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
'" 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
18 1 am not the first to advocate something like clear statement rules in this context. See
Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEx. L. REv. 795, 799 (1996)
(advocating a shift in approach from identification of boundaries to "policing Congress's
deliberative processes and its reasons for regulating"), Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the
Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2180, 2237 (1998)
(suggesting that courts consider the record before Congress and any formal findings in
determining whether legislation is "necessary and proper" to carrying out enumerated
powers); Gill Seinfeld, The Possibility of Pretext Analysis in Commerce Clause
Adjudication, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1251, 1324-27 (2003) (proposing a legislative
findings requirement in order to assure that Congress is regulating for a commercial
purpose).
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the text of the Act clearly explaining how it derived its authority to regulate the
intrastate possession of controlled substances from the Commerce Clause and
the Necessary and Proper Clause. The statutes invalidated in Lopez and United
States v. Morrison, by contrast, would have been easy cases for invalidation. In
those statutes, Congress did not spell out in the text any connection between the
regulation it imposed and its power to regulate interstate commerce. Thus,
requiring a clear statement by Congress would be consistent with the outcomes
of the Court's major Commerce Clause decisions of the Lopez era. Recasting
those decisions as resting on clear statement principles would require some
revisionism, but would be largely consistent with the values associated with
stare decisis.
II. CLEAR STATEMENT VERSUS PROHIBITORY STRATEGIES
In theory, courts can enforce any limitation on legislative power through
either a clear statement or a prohibitory strategy. In order to consider which
strategy is more appropriate in striking the balance between stability and
change in the federalism context, we must first pinpoint the differences
between the two strategies, and then consider some relevant variables that
should guide judges in choosing between them.
A. The Distinguishing Features of Clear Statement Rules
The key difference between clear statement rules and prohibitory
limitations is that clear statement rules are collaborative-they draw upon both
the courts and the political branches in determining the constitutionality of the
exercise of legislative power. The prohibitory approach, in contrast, is
unilateral-the question whether the legislature has transgressed the bounds of
the Constitution is determined by the courts alone.
The prohibitory strategy proceeds in two steps. First, the legislature enacts
a statute that arguably exceeds the limits of its constitutional authority. The
court then reviews this legislation against whatever limitations on legislative
power it determines to be appropriate based on its reading of the Constitution.
These limitations can be framed in terms of general principles, bright line rules,
standards of review, multi-factoral or balancing tests, or some combination
thereof, giving whatever deference to legislative explanations or findings the
courts deem appropriate. This is obviously the most familiar mode of judicial
review of legislation.
The clear statement strategy proceeds in three steps. First, the court
identifies a zone of sensitivity, i.e., an area close to the boundary of legislative
power, and specifies that the legislature must signal with some degree of clarity
that it is aware it is entering this zone. The court may also require that the
legislature identify the theory that would sustain its exercise of power within
this zone, including any particular findings necessary under that theory.
Second, the legislature decides to enter the zone and attempts to signal it is
doing so, together with any required specification of theory and findings. Third,
the court reviews the legislative signal and, if appropriate, its explanation and
2005]
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findings in order to determine whether they meet the requirements of the clear
statement standard.
Notice that courts play an active interpretational role under the clear
statement strategy, just as under the prohibitory strategy. Courts identify the
zones of sensitivity, they specify the required signal, they decide whether some
sort of explanation or finding is required, and they review the legislative
response to determine compliance with these requirements. But the ultimate
judgment of constitutionality under this approach is a joint product of the courts
and the political branches, not the unilateral judgment of the court. Both the
courts and the legislative branches must concur before the government will be
permitted to intrude into a previously-identified zone of constitutional
sensitivity.
B. Three Differentiating Variables
When is the clear statement strategy appropriate as opposed to the
prohibitory approach? Three variables seem to point toward the use of one
strategy as opposed to the other. They are: (1) the extent to which the
interpretational question entails the need to accommodate stability and change,
as opposed to merely promoting stability; (2) the extent to which the meaning
of the provision is a matter of doubt or is regarded as well settled; and (3) the
extent to which interpretation entails the determination of legislative facts
rather than adjudicative facts. I will briefly elaborate on each of these variables.
First, insofar as the process of constitutional interpretation is designed to
facilitate change in the scope of legislative powers, i.e., to effect a de facto
constitutional amendment, the collaborative form of interpretation associated
with the clear statement strategy has distinct advantages. The clear statement
approach requires the concurrence of multiple branches of government-all
three, actually, when we consider that the President participates in the
legislative process through the exercise of the veto. The participation of the
political branches injects a dynamic element into the process of interpretation
likely to be absent when the courts act alone. 19 The judiciary is oriented toward
"principled" interpretation, which requires that judgments be justified in terms
of constitutional text, original understanding, and established precedent. This
style of interpretation, because it is backward-looking, is heavily weighted
against change in the status quo. Clear statement rules establish a division of
labor between the political branches and the courts. The political branches,
which are relatively unconstrained by the requirements of principled
interpretation, can play the role of change agent, adopting a more aggressive
reading of the Constitution than courts would be comfortable making. The
courts can concentrate on promoting stability, by requiring that the political
branches take a second look before committing to such an aggressive
interpretation, and that they engage in appropriate deliberation before
fundamental change occurs.
19 Cf WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMic STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (contrasting
traditional and dynamic statutory interpretation).
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Requiring the concurrence of multiple branches has additional advantages
in facilitating constitutional change. Such concurrence enhances the likelihood
that the need for change will be correctly determined. Each branch has different
sources of information and different constituencies to which it is accountable,
and consensus about the need for change will reinforce the judicial willingness
to act. And it seems plausible that securing the assent of the political branches
means that a de facto amendment is more likely to be regarded by the public as
legitimate. Certainly, criticism of the judiciary for fostering constitutional
change will be muted if the political branches have also concurred in the
change.
In contrast, insofar as the function of constitutional interpretation is not to
accommodate change but solely to promote stability, the prohibitory strategy
seems more suitable. Just as clear statement rules promote dynamic
interpretation, prohibitory rules tend to reinforce the status quo. This follows
from the convention requiring that courts justify their decisions in terms of
preexisting sources of law. In addition, preserving the status quo requires no
calibration of the need for change. Lastly, when courts enforce the status quo,
their legitimacy is not likely to be called into question to the same degree as
when they seek to facilitate change. Thus, insofar as we view a particular
limitation as one that should be preserved in the face of transient agitation for
change-the protection for free speech, perhaps-the prohibitory strategy is
likely to dominate the clear statement approach.
Second, insofar as there is doubt about the correct meaning of a
constitutional limitation, the clear statement strategy can give the provision
content that eludes the judiciary. ° The courts must still identify zones of
sensitivity. But they need not determine the precise line within the zone where
the scope of permissible legislative power has been passed. Many times the
language of the Constitution is so vague, and the evidence of original
understanding so sparse, that particularizing the meaning of a constitutional
limitation is beyond the capabilities of the judicial method. In these
circumstances, legislative line drawing based on pragmatic judgment or
overlapping consensus may be a superior way to determine limits.
A possible illustration is provided by the "public use" limitation on the
exercise of the power of eminent domain found in the Fifth Amendment.
21
Courts have never been able to develop a coherent particularized account of
what "public use" means, and have settled on the vacuous notion that public
use means public purpose. This has led to widespread agitation for a more
precise prohibitory meaning. But rather than ask courts to develop artificial
restrictions on eminent domain, a better approach might be to require
legislative or administrative bodies to make a clear statement that a particular
exercise of the power is for a "public use," perhaps giving a brief explanation
in support of this determination. Such a clear statement requirement would
20 See Lessig, supra note 1, at 187 (noting that clear statement rules permit courts to
maintain fidelity to constitutional principles "without requiring of the Court some impossible
interpretative task").
21 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
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force democratically accountable decision makers to consider and give content
to the constitutional limitation. The process of requiring such an articulation
(subject to further judicial review for compliance with the clear statement
requirement) would arguably provide more protection for property owners than
the theoretical possibility of de novo judicial review under a vacuous
formulation.
In contrast, insofar as we are highly confident about the meaning of a
particular constitutional provision and the ability of the courts to elaborate on
that meaning over time, the prohibitory strategy is likely to be preferred to the
clear statement approach. Again, certain individual rights provisions of the
Constitution-the guarantee of free speech, or of racial equality, for example-
may fit this description. Obviously, if we think the courts have "got it right"
with respect to a particular type of limitation, there is less reason to dilute
judicial oversight with a collaborative model of interpretation that injects the
less predictable political branches into the interpretational process.
Third, the clear statement approach and the prohibitory approach correlate
with a predominance of different kinds of factual determinations.
Administrative lawyers often distinguish between legislative facts and
adjudicative facts.22  Legislative facts involve generalizations, usually
predictive, about human behavior. Adjudicative facts involve determinations,
always historical, about the behavior of specific individuals or institutions.
There is a strong tradition in American public law that politically accountable
bodies should be the primary determiners of legislative facts, and politically
insulated courts should be the primary determiners of adjudicative facts. This is
based in part on assumptions about the comparative competencies of
legislatures and courts, and in part on considerations of legitimacy.
Many constitutional provisions cry out for determinations of legislative
fact. For example, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 23 questions about
whether particular enactments are "necessary" entail making predictive
generalizations about future behavior. The Court has always deferred to
Congress in making such predictions.24 The clear statement strategy
comfortably accommodates such deference by asking whether Congress made
the appropriate legislative findings. The prohibitory strategy does not, since it
is unclear what standard of review courts should apply to legislative findings
under this approach, and there is always the temptation to substitute judicial for
legislative fact finding.
25
22 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 10.5-10.6 (Aspen Law
& Business 4th ed. 2002).
23 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
24 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417 (1819); Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004).
25 An interesting and somewhat parallel claim for the superiority of legislative fact-
finding is offered by Michael Paulsen, to the effect that the factors considered by the
Supreme Court in determining whether to overrule one of its precedents (thereby facilitating
constitutional change) involve factual determinations more appropriately made by
legislatures than courts. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May
Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1551-67
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Conversely, insofar as the interpretation and enforcement of a limitation
entails adjudicative facts, this tends to point toward a stronger role for courts in
the process of enforcing the limitation. The prohibition of legislative Bills of
Attainder is an illustration. 26 Determining whether a particular statute operates
as an attainder entails inquiry into particular historical facts about particular
individuals. Article III courts are institutionally designed to make these sorts of
determinations with accuracy and impartiality. Legislatures are not.
C. Other Factors Relevant to Choice of Strategy
In addition to the foregoing three variables, which seem helpful in
differentiating between the circumstances appropriate for clear statement rules
and prohibitory limitations, other policy arguments for or against the use of
clear statement rules have also been advanced. These arguments are not without
force, although they tend to cancel each other out to a considerable degree, and
thus are ultimately less helpful.
One fundamental objection to clear statement rules is that courts have no
authority to adopt such rules in interpreting the Constitution. Such rules, it is
claimed, are judicial creations, not requirements of the Constitution itself, and
under Marbury v. Madison27 the only authority of the courts is to review
legislation on the ground that it transgresses the Constitution, not some
judicially-identified "zone of sensitivity" surrounding a constitutional
28provision. If the question before the court is one of statutory interpretation,
perhaps the court can adopt a clear statement rule as a canon of interpretation;
in this application, clear statement rules are merely a species of the more
general canon of avoiding difficult constitutional questions.29 But when the
question concerns the meaning of the Constitution itself, a clear statement rule
functions like a judge-made "penumbra" that expands judicial authority in an
illegitimate fashion.
30
The answer to this objection, however, is that constitutional interpretation
has always been a collaborative endeavor, certainly where the exact limits of
constitutional authority are unclear. This is why courts often review legislative
enactments for unconstitutionality under a deferential standard of review-a
practice that predates even Marbury31-and why some constitutional provisions
are not enforced by courts at all. When courts "underenforce" constitutional
(2000).
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
27 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
28 1 am indebted to Robert Pushaw for drawing this criticism to my attention.
29 See Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 695, 720 (1996).
30 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 285 (1985).
31 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 395 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.)
(disclaiming power to declare legislation unconstitutional except in "a very clear case"); id.
at 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (stating that such power should be exercised only in a "clear
and urgent case"). See generally James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893).
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provisions in these ways, they are acknowledging that the political branches of
government play an important role in giving content to provisions whose
meaning is problematic.3 2 Clear statement rules represent yet another
interpretative technique that allows courts to share interpretative authority with
the political branches.
Another argument sometimes launched against clear statement rules is that
they are an affront to Congress, because they appear to dictate to Congress
about the manner in which a coequal branch conducts its business and exercises
its constitutionally assigned duties. 33 There is something to this concern,
especially if the Court continually changes the ground rules about how clear is
clear, whether supporting explanations or findings are required, and whether
the clear statements, explanations, and findings must be found in the text or
merely in the legislative history of an enactment. The heyday of clear statement
rules in federalism-the 1980s and early 1990s-was characterized by a fair bit
of shifting about with resF4ect to these ground rules, and this cast a certain taint
on the whole enterprise. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that
respect for Congress requires that the Court avoid gamesmanship in its
description of clear statement requirements.
In the end, however, whether clear statement rules are an affront to
Congress depends largely on the baseline against which they are assessed. If
the baseline is the anything-goes regime of Garcia, then clear statement rules
seem like an affront, because they impose certain conditions on judicial
willingness to enforce legislation in zones of sensitivity that did not exist
before. If the baseline is the prohibitory regime of Lopez, then clear statement
rules seem like a gesture of respect. Clear statement rules represent an offer to
collaborate with Congress in the determination of the scope of legislative
powers, rather than a threat to dictate such limits unilaterally. From the vantage
of a post-Lopez world, therefore, it is hard to get too exercised about the
dignitary implications of clear statement rules, provided they are applied by
courts in a consistent and good faith manner.
35
A third argument against clear statement rules is that they do not foreclose
the possibility that Congress could usurp every function traditionally performed
by state governments, thereby erasing the understanding that the federal
government is one of limited powers.36 This of course is the argument that lies
at the heart of Lopez-there must be some stopping point to the scope of
32 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
33 See, e.g., Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80
(2001).
34 See generally Philip P. Frickey and Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the
Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE
L.J. 1707 (2002).
35 See Lessig, supra note 1, at 207 ("If the Court can say that certain areas cannot be
regulated by Congress, I don't understand why it can't say that those areas can be regulated,
but only if Congress shows it has considered just why.").
36 Again, I thank Robert Pushaw for focusing my attention on this argument.
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congressional power, lest we no longer have a genuine system of federalism.
37
Clear statement rules, the argument goes, fail to meet this concern. They may
slow down the juggernaut of federal expansion, but they do not stop it.
Like most slippery slope arguments, this is an effective debater's point.
But it is doubtful whether debater's points should determine the structure of
constitutional law.38 Lopez's concern that there be some stopping point is
satisfied as long as the Court preserves a peppercorn of exclusive state
authority. But why should we care about peppercorns of state authority? What
really matters is preserving a sensible division of authority between the federal
government and the States, in which each level of government regulates
subjects appropriate to its respective sphere of competence.
39
Proponents of clear statement rules sometimes draw upon the so-called
political safeguards of federalism as a reason for requiring clear statements by
Congress. The Court endorsed the argument in Gregory v Ashcroft.40 Requiring
Congress plainly to state its intention to regulate traditional state functions puts
States on notice that they are targeted for regulation. This allows the States and
their allies to mobilize in opposition to such regulation, perhaps defeating or
modifying the proposal without any need for recourse to judicial enforcement
of prohibitory limits.
The efficacy of political safeguards has been much debated.41 Garcia
almost certainly exaggerated the extent to which traditional state prerogatives
are protected by the representation of state interests through Congress. Politics
has changed in a number of ways since the founding that have had the
42
collective effect of reducing the clout of the States in Congress. Others have
been more skeptical about the efficacy of clear statement rules in influencing
the behavior of Congress. The extreme version of the skeptical position is
captured in the sneering line that compliance with such rules is assured as long
as Congress is not burdened with a "stupid staff.' '43 In other words, compliance
with clear statement rules is just a formality to be discharged after the basic
political decision to regulate has been made on other grounds.
37 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564, 568 (1995).
38 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2667 n.19 (2005) (rejecting the
argument that the scope of government power should be fixed based on a "parade of
horribles[,]" because all power is subject to abuse).
39 See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 774-84 (1995); Jacques LeBoeuf,
The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31
SAN DIEGo L. REv. 555 (1994).
40 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
41 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215 (2000); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1459 (2001).
42 William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process
Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139 (1998); Calabresi, supra note 39, at 790-99.
43 Cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992)
(offering this characterization in response to the suggestion that the Court should defer to a
state legislative recitation of a harm-preventing justification for a regulation challenged as a
taking).
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In the end, whether the States are protected through the political process
and whether Congress is influenced by deliberation are empirical questions,
which I cannot answer with any confidence. As Ernest Young has rightly
emphasized, even if the political process does not work perfectly, this does not
mean that the political process imposes no restraint at all on the expansion of
federal power." To which I would add, even if deliberation requirements
impose only weak constraints, it does not follow that they have no effect at all.
Thus, to the extent we think that state and local governments have at least some
influence with Congress, and to the extent we wish to harness these political
safeguards as part of a larger strategy of accommodating stability and change in
intergovernmental relations, there is logic in imposing clear statement rules as
part of this general strategy of accommodation.
A final argument, which has played relatively little role in the debate but
perhaps deserves more consideration, concerns the implications of clear
statement rules in constraining executive branch officials-federal regulators
and prosecutors-from unilaterally changing the scope of federal authority. If
Congress must make a clear statement before amending the scope of federal
authority, then executive officials obviously cannot exercise federal power on
their own initiative until such a clear statement is forthcoming. In particular,
executive actors cannot leverage ambiguous grants of power into regulations
that expand federal authority in new ways. The clear statement strategy in
effect incorporates a kind of express delegation doctrine, which serves not only
to protect federalism values but separation of powers values as well.45
Against this claim it can be said that a prohibitory limitation will also
constrain executive officers, because if an area of regulation is beyond the
power of Congress it is presumably also beyond the power of the executive.
But it is plausible that the Court will be more willing to enforce clear statement
rules, over larger zones of sensitivity, than it will be to enforce prohibitory
limitations. If this is true, then the enforcement of clear statement rules
provides a separation of powers "bonus" in terms of constraining executive
actors, relative to the degree of constraint one would get with prohibitory
limitations. I would not make too much of this point in the larger balance of
considerations, but it weighs modestly in further support of the clear statement
approach.
D. How to Choose?
A complete assessment of clear statement rules versus prohibitory
limitations obviously entails considerable complexity. For present purposes, I
confine the inquiry to three questions that seem unambiguously relevant to the
exercise of choice. As particularized to the present context, which concerns the
proper strategy for interpreting the Commerce Clause, those questions are: (1)
44 See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1349
(2001).
45 See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 2097 (2004).
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Does the history of interpretation of the Commerce Clause reflect a desire to
accommodate stability and change, or has the primary focus been preserving
stability? (2) Is the correct meaning of the Commerce Clause a matter of doubt,
or is this something as to which we have a high degree of confidence? (3) Does
interpretation of the Commerce Clause entail the need to determine legislative
facts, or do adjudicative facts predominate?
Fortunately, we need not look far to discover the answers to these
questions. They are found in the Court's own decisions, starting with Lopez.
III. LOPEZ AND THE CHOICE OF INTERPRETATIVE STRATEGY
In 1995, the Supreme Court inaugurated a new Commerce Clause
doctrine. The animating theme of United States v. Lopez was the need to
impose some limit on the scope of the commerce power, lest the concept of
limited federal government be lost forever. As the Court put it, to uphold the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 "we would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by
the States.' 46 Lopez did not address whether the limiting principle should be
determined in collaboration with the political branches. The unstated
assumption was that the Court alone had to impose some prohibitory rule.
When we reconsider Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, however,
we find that it expressly addresses each of the three variables discussed in Part
II that critically determine the choice between clear statement rules and
prohibitory limitations. On each score, Lopez suggests, clear statement rules
would be preferable in determining the outer limits of the Commerce Clause.
First, the Lopez opinion readily acknowledges that "our interpretation of
the Commerce Clause has changed as our Nation has developed. ' ' 7 The
opinion includes a capsule history of interpretation of the Commerce Clause.4 s
According to that history, the commerce power was not used by Congress as a
basis for legislating during most of the nation's first hundred years, generating
little judicial doctrine about the limits of congressional power. In the early
twentieth century, the Court offered up somewhat inconsistent principles
limiting the power of Congress; invoking these principles, the Court invalidated
some early New Deal legislation as going beyond the scope of the power. A
few years later, the Court was forced to "depart[]" from these precedents.49 As
the Court candidly explained, the post-1937 decisions
ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly
expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that Clause.
In part, this was a recognition of the great changes that had occurred in
the way business was carried on in this country. Enterprises that had once
46 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
47 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (characterizing discussion in
Lopez).
48 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-58.
49 Id. at 555.
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been local or at most regional in nature had become national in scope.
But the doctrinal change also reflected a view that earlier Commerce
Clause cases artificially had constrained the authority of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce.50
It would be difficult to imagine a more explicit acknowledgement that the
Court's decisions in this area have functioned as de facto constitutional
amendments, adjusting the power of the federal government relative to the
States in response to changed circumstances.
Second, the Lopez opinion also acknowledged that there was considerable
doubt about the correct interpretation of the Commerce Clause. In response to
Justice Breyer's critique of the Court's newly-minted economic versus non-
economic distinction, the Chief Justice acknowledged that the distinction "may
in some cases result in legal uncertainty." 51 But the Chief Justice sought to
deflect criticism of this uncertainty by attributing it to the enterprise of
interpreting the scope of the Commerce Clause. As he put it:
The Constitution mandates this uncertainty by withholding from
Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every
type of legislation. Congress has operated within this framework of legal
uncertainty ever since this Court determined that it was the Judiciary's
duty "to say what the law is."
52
He further noted that previous decisions of the Court had characterized the
question of congressional power under the Commerce Clause as "necessarily
one of degree," 53 which also resulted in something less than a "precise
",54formulation[]. But he repeated once again that this lack of precision was
inevitable, given the very nature of the inquiry. Whatever one thinks of the
Chief Justice's analysis of the causes of uncertainty about the meaning of the
Commerce Clause, there can be no question that he recognized that the correct
meaning of the Clause was a matter of considerable doubt.
Third and finally, the Lopez opinion acknowledged that "legislative
findings" play an important role in Commerce Clause review. 55 The Fifth
Circuit, in the decision under review, had invalidated the Gun-Free School
Zones Act on the ground that Congress had made no findings, either in the text
of the statute or legislative history, explaining the connection between
possession of guns near schools and interstate commerce. 56 The Supreme Court
declined to follow the Fifth Circuit in invalidating the Act on what was in effect
a clear statement rationale. Nevertheless, the Court cited the lack of findings as
one factor underscoring its conviction that Congress had transgressed a
prohibitory limitation. As the Chief Justice ambiguously put it: "[T]o the extent
that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment
50 Id. at 556.
" Id. at 566.
52 Id. (citations omitted).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 567.
51 Id. at 562.
56 Lopez v. United States, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993).
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that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even
though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking
here."57 Thus, although the Court perceived that legislative facts were relevant
and important in Commerce Clause controversies, it declined to make this of
decisional significance.
In short, Lopez expressly acknowledged that each of the principal variables
discussed in Part II points toward the superiority of clear statement rules rather
than prohibitory limitations in implementing the Commerce Clause. It is not
clear why the Court ignored these signals and plunged ahead in an effort to
articulate a new prohibitory limitation. The best I can offer are some
conjectures.
The first is peculiar to Lopez itself. After the Fifth Circuit's decision, but
before the case reached the Supreme Court, Congress re-enacted the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, incorporating specific legislative findings about the effects
of firearm possession near schools on interstate commerce. This was not the
version of the statute before the Court, but the Court was aware of the existence
of the amended version of the Act.59 Consequently, it may have seemed to
Chief Justice Rehnquist and his allies that it would be an empty ritual to
invalidate the 1990 version of the Act for want of a clear statement, when it
was a foregone conclusion that Congress would re-adopt the statute with such a
statement-indeed, it had already done so. In other words, in the peculiar
circumstances of Lopez, imposing a clear statement requirement would have
seemed like an especially lame expression by the Court of the need for greater
stability.
Other developments in federalism jurisprudence about the same time also
may have convinced the Chief Justice and his allies that clear statement rules
do not offer enough protection for federalism values. As previously noted, in
the Eleventh Amendment context the Court had refused to allow suits against
States under a number of statutory schemes on the ground that Congress had
not authorized such suits explicitly in the text of the statute. Toward the end of
the 1980s and into the 1990s, the Court began to review cases in which
Congress, in response to these rulings, arguably had made just such an explicit
statement. One could see this as evidence that clear statement rules work. Or,
one could see it as evidence that clear statement requirements are mere
formalities that do little to slow down the intrusion of federal power into areas
of traditional state autonomy. Those Justices who thought Congress was too
profligate in subjecting States to new forms of liability may have concluded
that the latter was the more likely explanation. Perhaps this perception spilled
over to the Commerce Clause context, convincing the majority that only a
57 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
58 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, §
320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125-26 (1994).
59 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 n.4 (discussing amended statute).
60 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491
U.S. 223 (1989).
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prohibitory limitation would secure a stopping point to the relentless expansion
of federal regulation.
6 1
A final possibility is that the Court felt boxed in by its own Commerce
Clause precedent. In the other areas where the Court had adopted the clear
statement approach-Eleventh Amendment immunity, conditional spending,
and extension of general federal regulation to traditional state functions-it was
writing on a relatively blank slate. In the context of the Commerce Clause,
however, a number of previous decisions had considered, at least in passing,
how far Congress must spell out its reasoning in support of an exercise of
authority under the Clause. These decisions sometimes gave significant weight
to congressional findings. 62 But on other occasions the Court had said that no
findings were required.
In the face of this precedent, imposition of a new prohibitory limitation,
which purported to be grounded in a restatement of prior case law, may have
seemed less vulnerable to criticism than articulation of a clear statement rule
that would have required the Court explicitly to disapprove some statements in
its prior cases. The reality is that the clear statement approach would have been
more collaborative, and hence ultimately more restrained. But the short-term
exigencies of holding together a bare majority of five may have impelled Chief
Justice Rehnquist toward the prohibitory strategy, since such an opinion could
be written without questioning any prior decision.
IV. LOPEZ'S FLAWED PROHIBITORY RULE
Lopez's apparent mistake in its choice of interpretative strategy might be
forgivable, if the Court came up with a prohibitory rule that was securely
grounded in constitutional traditions and provided a workable formula for
resolving future disputes. Unfortunately, the opposite is more true. The
prohibitory limitation devised by Lopez was not based on any inquiry into the
original understanding, or even on a general theory of the proper division of
functions between the federal government and the States. Instead, it was
cobbled together from the Court's prior decisional law. Lopez's basic game
plan was to glean certain generalizations from the Court's post-New Deal case
law-generalizations that could be said to reflect the constitutional status
quo-and turn those generalizations into a prohibitory limitation on the
exercise of congressional power. The idea, in effect, was to ratify or
61 Support for this conjecture is found in Morrison, where the majority responded to the
extensive findings in the legislative history seeking to establish a connection between gender
related violence and interstate commerce as follows: "Given these findings and petitioners'
arguments, the concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the Commerce
Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local
authority seems well founded." United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000).
62 See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation, 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981).
63 See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971). In fact, Congress had
made formal findings in the anti-loan sharking statute upheld in Perez. For the Court's
inconsistent responses over time to congressional findings, see Frickey, supra note 29, at
708-20.
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grandfather innovations of the past that the public had come to take for granted,
while allowing the Court to review with skepticism further innovations in
federal power falling outside the pattern reflected in prior adjudications. The
Court in effect drew a line in the sand and said: thus far and no further.
The prohibitory rule inaugurated by Lopez has two prominent elements: a
tripartite classification of permissible Commerce Clause regulations, and a
limitation on the most frequently invoked branch of this classification to
phenomena that can be regarded as "economic." Both of these features were
derived by generalizing post-New Deal precedents.
Consider first the tripartite classification of commerce clause regulations:
regulations of the channels of commerce, regulations of instrumentalities of
commerce or things in commerce, and regulations of activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce. This classification made its first
appearance in Perez v. United States64 where it was presented as a rough
summary of prior decisional law. It was then repeated in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation,65 again as a generalization about prior
holdings. In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist cleverly transformed this
description of prior precedent into a fixed menu of the permissible options
available to Congress, the implication being that Congress must fit its
legislation into one of the three categories or risk invalidation.
This doctrinal sleight of hand would be regarded as quite silly if it did not
have the imprimatur of the Supreme Court behind it. First, it is not clear that
the three-part classification, cavalierly tossed off by Justice Douglas in his
opinion for the Court in Perez, is descriptively accurate. Where do the cases
that permit Congress to regulate based on the presence of some interstate
commerce jurisdictional hook-such as the mail or wire fraud statutes-fit in?
Lopez quoted a passage from Heart of Atlanta Motel implying that such cases
involve protecting the channels of interstate commerce from "immoral and
injurious uses."66 But it seems utterly implausible to say that Congress is
protecting the postal system or the telephone system from immorality by
criminalizing frauds that use the mails or interstate telephone lines. Later in the
opinion, the Court noted that one of the defects in the Gun-Free School Zones
Act was that it contained "no jurisdictional element which would ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects
interstate commerce. ' 67 Thus, the Court acknowledged the validity of the
jurisdictional hook decisions. Why not then include them directly as a fourth
category in the typology of permissible Commerce Clause regulations?
Similarly, it is unclear where the Shreveport Rate Cases68 fit in. The
question in Shreveport was whether the Interstate Commerce Commission
' 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
65 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981).
66 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995), quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964), quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470, 491 (1917).
67 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
68 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
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could override state regulation of intrastate railroad rates. Economically
speaking, railroads operate as a single integrated enterprise, deriving revenue
from both intrastate and interstate movements. If rates are held too low on
intrastate movements, this puts pressure on carriers to charge higher rates on
interstate movements. Recognizing this reality, the Court in Shreveport
permitted federal regulation of intrastate railroad rates in order to avoid
frustration of a federal scheme regulating interstate railroad rates. Lopez cited
Shreveport as an example of a regulation of intrastate commerce designed to
"protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce." 69 But this is accurate
only if one understands "protecting instrumentalities" to include "assuring the
economic viability of integrated corporations that engage in part in interstate
commerce." Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court provided a more accurate
recapitulation of Shreveport,70 and it went on to observe that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act could not be justified under the Shreveport doctrine because
it was "not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated. 71 But again, why not include the Shreveport doctrine directly
as another category of permissible regulation under the Commerce Clause?
Even if the three-part classification were accurate, from whence does it
derive its normative force? The Court made no attempt, either in Lopez or
subsequent decisions, to connect its classification of permissible regulations to
the language of the Constitution, the purposes of the Framers, or some
normative theory of the proper role of the federal government in a federated
system. Since the classification scheme started as a description of Supreme
Court decisional law, its normative force is no greater than the normative force
of the decisions it purports to restate. Those cases are at best a mixed bag in
terms of connecting up with some larger vision of constitutional federalism.
The only apparent virtue of the tripartite classification was its grounding in
relatively contemporary, post-New Deal decisional law. The Chief Justice
apparently thought this feature would grandfather past innovations, on the
assumption that they would fall within the scheme. Yet by wrapping up all
prior innovations in a tidy, three-part scheme, the doctrine also promised to
give the Court authority to strike down new innovations it did not like, on the
ground that they went beyond what was permissible under the scheme.
The second prominent element of the new doctrine was the suggestion that
the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate intrastate activity only if
that activity is "economic" in nature. This element has the same provenance as
the three-part classification scheme, namely, a synthesis of the Court's past
decisions, transformed by sleight of hand in Lopez into a normative limitation.
69 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
70 Id. at 554 (noting that the Court had held regulation permissible "where the interstate
and intrastate aspects of commerce were so mingled together that full regulation of interstate
commerce required incidental regulation of intrastate commerce," citing Shreveport).
71 Id. at 561.
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The sleight of hand here can be traced through the late Chief Justice's
successive characterizations of Wickard v. Filburn,72 the Court's seminal
opinion on the power of Congress to regulate activity that has a substantial
affect on interstate commerce. In his first pass at Wickard, the Chief Justice
provided a relatively full quotation: "[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce .... 7" A page later, this was shortened to "Congress may regulate
activity that 'exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."'
74
Notice that "economic" in these passages refers primarily to the effect of the
regulation, not the activity regulated.
Some pages later, Wickard and other substantial effects cases were then
said to reflect a pattern that was clear: "Where economic activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
sustained., 75 Then, several pages after that, the substantial effects test was
restated again: "We do not doubt that Congress has authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce and also affect the educational process.' 76 Notice
that, in these passages, "economic" or "commercial" has migrated over from
the effect of the regulation, to a description of the activity regulated.
Then comes the clincher: "The possession of a gun in a local school zone
is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce."77 This seems to say
unequivocally that the activity regulated must be economic in nature, not just
the effect of the regulation. But there is no support for this proposition in
Wickard, or any other precedent of the Court before Lopez.
78
In Morrison, five years later, this spurious generalization from prior cases
was elevated to the status of fixed limitation on congressional power. Relying
almost exclusively on Lopez, the Court observed that "where we have sustained
federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity's substantial
effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of
economic endeavor." 79 Although the Court drew up short of announcing "a
72 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
73 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29).
74 Id. at 557 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125).
15 Id. at 560.
76 Id. at 565-66.
77 Id. at 567.
78 Indeed, as Robert Schapiro and William Buzbee have pointed out, there are at least
two Supreme Court cases from early decades of the twentieth century that say the exact
opposite: it is the effect on interstate commerce, not the economic or commercial nature of
the activity regulated, that marks the limits of congressional power. See Robert A. Schapiro
& William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce
Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1213-14, 1217-18 (2003), citing Second
Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 115-17 (1912); United States v. Ferger, 250 U.S. 199,
203 (1919).
79 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000).
2005]
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity," it
pointedly observed that "thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld
Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is
economic in nature."
The economic activity limitation, unlike the three-part classification,
arguably has some connection to the language of the Constitution. The
Constitution refers to commerce, and commerce-the contractual exchange of
goods and services-covers much but not all economic activity. But why talk
about economic activity, when the Constitution says commerce? Should not a
Commerce Clause doctrine require a linkage to commerce, i.e., buying and
selling? Moreover, as in the case of the tripartite scheme, the Court made no
effort to link the economic activity limitation to the purposes of the Framers or
a theory of federalism. The virtue of the limitation, again, appeared to be that it
promised to validate what has gone before, while permitting the Court to strike
down newer innovations, on the ground that they target "non-economic"
activity for regulation.
Whatever its analytical weaknesses, the Court's new prohibitory doctrine
would at least be entitled to some respect if the Court were prepared to stick to
it. But warning signs quickly emerged that the Court would have difficulty
consistently enforcing the tripartite scheme or the limitation to economic
activities. The Lopez strategy, it turned out, did not successfilly grandfather all
federal regulatory programs that were well-entrenched and enjoyed widespread
popular and political support. Modem federal environmental legislation, for
example, enjoys widespread popular and political support, and is largely based
on the commerce power.81 But many environmental laws are not drafted in
such a way that the activity being regulated-degradation of air, water, or other
natural resources-is described in "economic" terms. Rather, they are drafted
on the supposition that degradation of air, water, and other resources can be
prohibited because of the effect this would have on interstate commerce.
The potential difficulties Lopez posed for environmental legislation were
soon revealed in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC),82 where the Court confronted a
challenge to the constitutionality of the Clean Water Act as applied to isolated
intrastate waters. The relevant agencies had promulgated a regulatory guideline
indicating that federal controls would be applied to intrastate waters if they
serve as habitat for migratory birds. Under the Court's new prohibitory
doctrine, this "migratory bird rule" should have been an easy case for
invalidation. Isolated intrastate waters are not channels of commerce; migratory
birds are not instrumentalities of commerce or items in interstate commerce;
'0 Id. at 613.
81 See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal
Environmental Regulation, 90 IowA L. REv. 377, 404-06 (2005). Adler also shows that
lower federal courts have been very resistant to using Lopez and Morrison to invalidate
federal environmental laws, id. at 406-21, creating what amounts to an ad hoc
"environmental" exception to the Court's prohibitory doctrine.
12 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
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and the coming and going of migratory birds is not a form of economic activity,
and hence should not be eligible for aggregation under the substantial effects
test. But the Court ducked the constitutional question, and ruled on statutory
grounds. Why? Quite likely because the briefing in the case made clear that
invalidation would jeopardize the federal wetlands preservation program and
the Endangered Species Act, both of which enjoy widespread political support.
We come now to Gonzales v. Raich,83 and the question of whether
Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit possession of
locally grown marijuana to be used in the home for medical purposes. The
Ninth Circuit, in a plausible application of the Court's new Commerce Clause
doctrine, said no.84 Marijuana grown locally and consumed at home is neither a
channel nor an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Congress can regulate it
only on the ground that possession of marijuana has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. But, said the Ninth Circuit, possession of a substance for
purposes of self-medication is not an economic activity. So the Controlled
Substances Act, as applied to the two plaintiffs in Raich, was unconstitutional.
The problem with this relatively straightforward analysis, as in SWANCC,
is that this application of the Court's new prohibitory doctrine threatened
another federal program-the War on Drugs-that is also well entrenched and
enjoys widespread political support. Not universal support: According to the
government's brief, approximately one in ten Americans smokes marijuana.
And the good citizens of California had adopted the Compassionate Use Act,
permitting medical use of marijuana, by popular referendum. But the War on
Drugs enjoys massive support overall, and a ruling that Congress could not
regulate marijuana grown and consumed at home would presumably also mean
that Congress could not regulate methamphetamines, LSD, or ecstasy produced
and consumed at home. The grandfathering strategy of Lopez was not intended
to cast the Court in the role of revolutionary, undermining popular shibboleths
like the War on Drugs.
Thus it was that in Raich a very different majority, composed largely of
the dissenters in the previous cases, watered down the prohibitory theory
inaugurated in Lopez. The principal opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, gave
a perfunctory bow to the tripartite analysis of Commerce Clause regulations
emphasized by Lopez. 85 But Justice Stevens stressed that the CSA fell into
another category mentioned by Lopez, of intrastate activity that is "an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."" This
language, as we have seen, was designed to encapsulate the rationale of the
Shreveport Rate Cases, which otherwise fit poorly within the tripartite scheme.
One can therefore read Raich as elevating regulation of something that is an
"essential part of a larger scheme of economic regulation" to the status of a
fourth category of permitted Commerce Clause regulation.
83 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
84 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
" Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205.
86 Id. at 2209 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
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With respect to the innovation limiting the substantial effects test to
economic activity, the new majority did not deny that such a restriction had
been imposed by Lopez and Morrison. But it largely drained the innovation of
any significance, by defining "economic" in sweepingly broad terms:
Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by
the CSA are quintessentially economic. "Economics" refers to "the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities." Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 720 (1966). The CSA is a statute that
regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities
for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market....
Because the CSA is a statute that directly regulates economic,
commercial activity, our opinion in Morrison casts no doubt on its
constitutionality.
87
As Justice O'Connor observed in her dissent, this definition of economic-
essentially any activity that could be the subject of market exchange, without
regard to whether it was-is so broad it threatens "to sweep all of productive
human activity into federal regulatory reach. 88
One can of course read Raich's revisionist characterizations of Lopez and
Morrison narrowly, as adding an additional category of permissible regulation
and broadening the concept of economic. But a more accurate reading of the
new majority's intentions is signaled by its admonition to lower courts that they
should not read Lopez and Morrison "myopic[ally]" or through a "narrow
prism," but rather should interpret them against "the larger context of modem-
era Commerce Clause jurisprudence preserved by those cases."89 In other
words, Lopez and Morrison have been largely confined to their facts.
What can we learn from the rapid rise and apparently equally rapid fall of
Lopez's prohibitory strategy? First, Lopez based its prohibitions on
generalizations drawn from a very limited database-basically post-New Deal
Commerce Clause controversies that had been adjudicated by the Court itself.
This database was too small to capture the full range of regulations Congress
has adopted under the Commerce Clause. In effect, the Court made the classic
mistake of equating its own case law with the larger universe of regulation. As
it turned out, the Court's generalizations were quite threatening to a significant
number of established regulations, including environmental statutes like the
Clean Water Act and the Controlled Substances Act. Since a majority of the
Court was unwilling to invalidate these popular enactments, the prohibitory
strategy had to give way.
Second, even within the universe of its narrow database, the
generalizations Lopez elevated to prohibitory limitations were in critical
respects of doubtful accuracy as a synthesis of prior decisional law. The fact
that these generalizations overlooked or distorted elements in a more complex
doctrinal picture easily rendered the prohibitory strategy vulnerable to
revisionism. When the narrow majority supporting Lopez and Morrison gave
17 Id. at 2211.
88 Id. at 2224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 2209.
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way as the Court encountered statutes that enjoy broader and more entrenched
support, other doctrines downplayed in Lopez, like the Shreveport doctrine,
could be called upon to perform a rite of validation.
Third, the Court's strategy ignored the central lesson of history it had itself
recognized in Lopez-the need to accommodate stability and change. The
Court sought to draw a line in the sand, acquiescing in previous changes while
warning against future innovations. But since change is inevitable, it was an
exercise in hubris doomed from the start.
V. THE CLEAR STATEMENT ALTERNATIVE
Instead of synthesizing judicially-defined and enforceable prohibitory
rules, the Court should have extended the clear statement strategy it developed
in other types of federalism cases in the 1980s and early 1990s to Commerce
Clause controversies. I will not attempt to spell out the details of such a
doctrine here. It is enough for now to state a few general principles governing
the major questions that would be encountered in developing such a
jurisprudence, and suggest how those principles would apply to the recent
decisions.
One obvious question is how the courts would identify the zones of
sensitivity that require articulation of a clear statement by the political
branches. Here I think no set formula is possible. The zones should be
identified based on historical experience in implementing the Commerce
Clause, leavened with some common sense. For example, the Court's tripartite
analysis of permissible forms of Commerce Clause regulation, which I have
criticized as a prohibitory limitation, could be used as a partial guide to the
circumstances requiring a clear statement. The Court has recognized on several
occasions that regulations of the channels of interstate commerce or of
instrumentalities of interstate commerce are generally unproblematic under the
tripartite division, and this suggests that such regulations would also steer clear
of any zone of sensitivity. In contrast, regulations that rest on the substantial
effects test are more controversial, and hence more likely to intrude into a zone
of sensitivity.
Similarly, the Court's economic/non-economic distinction, which I have
also criticized, might be of relevance in determining whether a regulation
intrudes into a zone of sensitivity. It is intuitively plausible that a regulation
resting on the aggregation of clearly commercial intrastate transactions, such as
initiating commercial loans, is less likely to intrude into a zone of sensitivity
than a regulation resting on the aggregation of non-economic intrastate activity,
such as endangering insects or frogs.
Another issue concerns the form the clear statement must take, such as
whether it must be in the text of the statute or the legislative history, and
whether it must advance a theory of constitutional authority or merely cite
findings. These sorts of questions bedeviled the Court's development of a clear
statement strategy in the early years of the Rehnquist Court. The Court's
inconsistent answers, and the criticism this provoked, may have contributed to
the shift to the prohibitory strategy.
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With the benefit of hindsight, I think that whatever clear statement is
required, it must be in the text of the statute itself. Only the text represents the
official action of the political branches, so only the text can be attributed
unambiguously to the political branches. 90 Looking elsewhere for clear
statements will give rise to endless debates about what kinds of unofficial
materials can be fairly attributed to Congress or the President. Because of these
uncertainties, such an investigation is also likely give rise to charges of
gamesmanship and impermissible intrusion by courts into the internal affairs of
Congress. More fundamentally, giving dispositive legal significance to
legislative history materials is problematic as a matter of first principles, since
such material by definition does not satisfy the Constitution's bicameral and
presentment requirements for the exercise of legislative power. Thus, limiting
the operation of clear statement rules to clear statements rendered in the text of
duly enactment statutes both simplifies the clear statement strategy, and makes
it more legitimate.91
At the same time, respect for Congress as a coequal branch of
government-at least in the context of the Commerce Clause-requires that
Congress must do more than set forth its "legislative findings." It also requires
that Congress specify its understanding of why a particular regulation is
permissibly grounded in a constitutional grant of legislative power. The
enumerated powers of Article I, Section 8 are given to Congress, not to the
courts. Thus, it should not be for the courts to specify which theories about the
scope of the Commerce Clause are permissible, and which are forbidden. The
courts should invalidate legislation enacted under this authority only when
Congress has failed to explain what power it is exercising and why its law can
be derived from that grant. In most cases, it will be clear from the mechanics of
the enactment what theory Congress is invoking. But when it is not clear, and
the regulation is one the courts conclude intrudes into a zone of sensitivity,
courts should require Congress to spell out its theory of constitutionality.
Some theories of constitutionality, such as the theory that a particular
activity must be regulated because it will have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, necessarily presuppose certain findings of legislative facts. When
Congress invokes such a theory, it should also set forth in the text of the statute
the findings that it believes support the exercise of power under its theory. The
absence of such findings should also be a basis for invalidating the legislation
for lack of the required clear statement.
A final issue concerns the standard of review courts should apply in
determining whether congressional explanations of constitutionality, and any
required legislative findings of fact, satisfy the clear statement standard. Here I
believe the traditional rationality standard is appropriate. This is the settled
standard of review in considering challenges to the exercise of the commerce
90 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L.
REv. 1 (2001).
91 See William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 87 (2001) (arguing that legislative findings set forth in the statutory text are entitled
to weight even if those in the legislative history are problematic).
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power, and none of the Court's recent decisions has challenged this
understanding. 92 Thus, once a court has determined that Congress has made the
required clear statements-both as to theory of legislative power and as to any
required findings of legislative fact-the courts should confine their further
review of these clear statements to the question whether a rational legislature
could believe them to be true and accurate. The ultimate test, therefore, is one
that entails great deference to the political branches of government.
The forgoing general principles would make the clear statement strategy at
once more constraining and less constraining than the current prohibitory
doctrine announced in Lopez. It would be more constraining because federal
legislation could no longer be sustained on the basis of ex-post arguments by
government lawyers about what power Congress might have been exercising,
or what facts Congress might have imagined to exist in support of such an
exercise of power. Nor could legislation be sustained based on findings
allegedly contained in legislative history. The courts would look to what
Congress has formally announced its source of authority to be, or what
legislative power is implicit in the terms of the legislation itself. If no apparent
source of authority appears, as in the original version of the Gun-Free School
Zone Act struck down in Lopez, this would be the death-knell of the legislation.
In this way, the clear statement rule would assure that Congress is held
accountable for squaring its assertions of power with the powers conferred
upon it by the text of the Constitution.
Such a clear statement rule would be less constraining, however, because
the Court would not take it upon itself to prescribe fixed limits on the exercise
of legislative power under any clause of the Constitution. For example, if
Congress passed a law requiring all persons to protect endangered species
wherever they are found, and justified this on the ground that protecting genetic
diversity is important to fostering interstate and foreign commerce in
biomedical and bio-engineered products, the court would assess such a statute
on its own terms, and would ask whether a legislature could rationally believe
this to be an appropriate exercise of the power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce. It would not demand proof that the law fits within a particular
classification of previously recognized forms of commerce regulation, nor
would it insist that protecting endangered species be capable of characterization
as a type of "economic activity." In this sense, the clear statement approach
would confer greater flexibility on Congress than Lopez and Morrison appeared
to contemplate.
I will close by considering how such a clear statement regime would apply
to the Court's recent Commerce Clause decisions. Lopez is easy. The 1990
version of the Gun-Free School Zones Act contained no hint of what theory of
constitutionality might sustain the Act, nor did it contain any statutory findings
of legislative fact. The Court would have been amply justified in invalidating
the Act under a clear statement approach.
92 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208-09 (collecting authorities).
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United States v. Morrison is also easy. At first blush it might seem that
Morrison is a more difficult case under a clear statement approach because, as
the Court acknowledged, the Violence Against Women Act was "supported by
numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence
has on victims and their families." 93 But it turns out that all the "legislative
findings" referred to by the Court were contained in the legislative history, not
in the text of the Act itself. The text of the Act includes only a bare assertion of
power to legislate; there is no explication in the text of the constitutional theory
that would support legislation under the Commerce Clause, nor any
enumeration of findings in the text.94 Under the clear statement strategy I have
outlined, the Court therefore would also have been warranted in striking down
the Violence Against Women Act.
Two other decisions rendered after Morrison, but before Raich, are
consistent with the clear statement approach. In Jones v. United States,95 the
Court construed a statute making it a federal crime to commit arson on any
property "used in interstate or foreign commerce" to exclude arson of an
owner-occupied residence. One reason the Court cited in support of this
narrowing construction was the canon of interpretation that statutes should be
construed to avoid serious constitutional questions-in this case, whether
Congress would have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate arson of
any occupied dwelling in the United States. But it also gave a clear statement
rationale, noting that "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not
be deemed to have sinificantly changed the federal-state balance in the
prosecution of crimes.'9 Jones thus provides direct support for the proposition
that the clear statement approach continues to apply, notwithstanding the
emergence of the prohibitory strategy associated with Lopez.
Equally instructive is SWANCC. The Clean Water Act, in section 404(a),
extends federal regulatory control over all "navigable waters" of the United
States.97 Navigable waters are in turn defined to be "waters of the United
,,98States. The government argued in SWANCC that this definition signaled
Congress's intention to assert control over all bodies of water to the fullest
extent permitted by the Commerce Clause. Thus, the government argued, the
93 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000).
94 The relevant statutory provision reads:
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under Section 8 of Article I of
the Constitution, it is the purpose of this part to protect the civil rights of victims of
gender motivated violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting
interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of
violence motivated by gender.
Violence Against Women Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(a) (2000). The statute, in other
words, at most asserts that the cause of action it creates for gender motivated violence will
"affect" interstate commerce; it does not explain why or offer any supporting findings.
9' 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
96 Id. at 858, quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (internal quotes
removed).
9' 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).
9' Id. § 1362(7).
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migratory bird rule was constitutional, at least as applied to isolated sand and
gravel pit in the case before the Court, because the site was to be filled with
solid waste, which is a byproduct of interstate commerce. But the Court
demurred, again finding that Congress had not spoken clearly enough to sustain
such an interpretation. The Court supported its narrow construction of the act,
as in Jones, by stressing that this would avoid a serious constitutional
question-presumably, the question whether intrastate activity described in
non-economic terms (filling an isolated site used by migratory birds) could be
aggregated to find a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
The same outcome would be reached in SWANCC under the clear
statement analysis proposed here. As the Court explained, by conferring
authority over "navigable waters," Congress seemed to be invoking its power to
regulate the channels of interstate commerce-in this case, navigable rivers and
lakes.99 By defining navigable waters to be the "waters of the United States,"
Congress apparently intended to go beyond the traditional understanding of
navigability. But it was unclear, certainly on the face of the statute, whether
Congress was invoking its power to regulate activity that has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. There was, as the Court noted, "nothing
approaching a clear statement from Congress that it intended § 404(a) to reach
an abandoned sand and gravel pit such as we have here." 10 The Court was
therefore correct to invalidate the migratory bird rule and any other
construction of the statute grounded in a substantial effects analysis, since
Congress never articulated an intention to permit regulation on that theory.
We come at last to Gonzalez v. Raich. How would the Controlled
Substances Act and the regulation of marijuana possessed for purposes of
medical treatment fare under the clear statement approach? Not all that badly,
as it turns out. In contrast to the enactments struck down in Lopez and
Morrison, and the statutes narrowly construed in Jones and SWANCC,
Congress in the Controlled Substances Act made specific statutory findings that
seem to track a Shreveport-like rationale, or perhaps a Shreveport plus
Wickard-like rationale. Specifically, Congress found:
A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through
interstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic which are not an
integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local
distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct
effect upon interstate commerce because-
(A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are transported in
interstate commerce,
(B) controlled substances distributed locally usually have been
transported in interstate commerce immediately before their distribution,
and
99 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng., 531
U.S. 159, 168 n.3 (2001).
10o Id. at 174.
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(C) controlled substances possessed commonly flow through interstate.... 101
commerce immediately prior to such possession.
What is more, Congress specifically found, again in the text of the law,
that "local distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to
swelling the interstate traffic in such substances;" that "controlled substances
manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be differentiated from controlled
substances manufactured and distributed interstate;" and therefore that "it is not
feasible to distinguish" between such substances "in terms of controls." In
short, Congress found, "federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic
in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate
incidents of such traffic."
' 0 2
These statutory findings reflect a conscious awareness that the source of
congressional authority to regulate the possession of controlled substances is
the Commerce Clause. Furthermore, they set forth a reasoned explanation of
why it is "essential" to regulate intrastate possession in order to have an
effective regime of controls over interstate commercial transactions in such
substances. Of course, it is possible to find fault with this explanation. There is
no specific finding about medical uses of marijuana or use of controlled
substances in ways permitted by state law. But Congress cannot be expected to
be clairvoyant. It would be quite unusual, not to say unworkable, to make the
constitutionality of federal legislation fluctuate based on subsequently enacted
state law, unless of course Congress has built this feature into its legislation.
So I would conclude that, under the clear statement version of federalism I
have sketched, the outcome reached by the Court in Raich was also correct.
Congress clearly stated in the text of the CSA that it was regulating intrastate
possession in order to effectuate its control of interstate commerce in controlled
substances. The nexus Congress identified between the power asserted and the
objects regulated is clearly a rational one, without regard to any particular
classification of powers or menu of permissible options. Such a judgment both
honors the Constitution and yet gives Congress significant flexibility to adopt
that document to changing circumstances in keeping with the basic principle of
federalism the Framers sought to establish.
Raich presented a perfect opportunity for the Court to recast its new
Commerce Clause doctrine in terms of clear statement rules. There are hints of
a clear statement approach in Justice Stevens's opinion: naturally, he took full
advantage of the impressive delineation of constitutional theory and supporting
findings contained in the text of the CSA. 10 3 But the Court drew up well short
of repudiating the prohibitory doctrine of Lopez, and turning unambiguously to
clear statement rules. Fortunately, if the Court were to take this step in the
future, it could point to Raich as a prime example of how Congress can
function as a collaborative partner in determining the limits of constitutional
power under a regime of clear statement rules. And it could say with
01 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (2000).
102 21 U.S.C. § 801(4), (5), (6).
103 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2203 n.20, 2207, 2208, 2208 n.32, 2212,
2215 (2005).
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confidence that the outcomes of its post-Lopez decisions, if not the reasoning of
those decisions, are fully consistent with the clear statement strategy. Thus,
turning to a clear statement strategy could be substantially reconciled with the
policies underlying stare decisis.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Lopez doctrine, like other elements of the federalism revolution, was a
product of conflicting impulses. One was a sense that the Constitution is out of
balance, the federal government has grown too powerful, and the forces of
constitutional change have outraced the need to preserve a sense of continuity
and stability. Another was fear of doing anything that would deny the public
the benefits of big government it has come to expect and rely upon.
Unfortunately, the strategy the Court selected for reconciling these conflicting
impulses-devising a prohibitory doctrine based on an inaccurate synthesis of
the Court's own post-New Deal cases-was the wrong strategy to achieve a
rebalancing of fundamental values. A far better approach would have been to
continue to build a regime of clear statement rules, slowing down the intrusion
of federal power into areas of sensitivity, and seeking to limit further federal
growth to problem areas that all three branches agree require such a solution. It
is not too late to turn from prohibitory limitations to clear statements rules.
Given the collapse of the Lopez doctrine in Raich, doing so may be the last
remaining option for rescuing federalism.
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